We investigate public key encryption that allows the originator of a ciphertext to retrieve a "forgotten" plaintext from the ciphertext. This type of public key encryption with "backward recovery" contrasts more widely analyzed public key encryption with "forward secrecy". We advocate that together they form the two sides of a whole coin, whereby offering complementary roles in data security, especially in cloud computing, 3G/4G communications and other emerging computing and communication platforms. We formalize the notion of public key encryption with backward recovery, and present two construction methods together with formal analyses of their security. The first method embodies a generic public key encryption scheme with backward recovery using the "encrypt then sign" paradigm, whereas the second method provides a more efficient scheme that is built on Hofheinz and Kiltz's public key encryption in conjunction with target collision resistant hashing. Security of the first method is proved in a two-user setting, whereas the second is in a more general multi-user setting.
Introduction
Forward security, a notion first proposed by Günther [10] in the context of key exchange, has been well studied during the past decade. It guarantees the security of past uses of a secret key. Notably, past ciphertexts associated with a forward secure encryption scheme cannot be decrypted by an adversary even if the adversary possesses the current decryption key. A corollary of forward security is that it is infeasible even for either a receiver or a sender to recover plaintexts from past ciphertexts. A related point is that with traditional public key encryption, a sender is in general not able to decrypt a ciphertext he sent earlier. At a first look it might sound strange that a sender wants to decrypt a past ciphertext, given that it was him who created the ciphertext from a plaintext in his possession in the first place. As will be shown below, with the advent of new generations of computing and communication systems, users are increasingly relying on external storage to maintain data, especially when the amount of data exceeds the capacity of their local computing.
These questions are a direct motivation for us to inquire into public key encryption that admits the backward recovery of plaintexts by their originator while at the same time ensuring that the originator can verify whether a ciphertext was produced by himself earlier.
Our result. Our first contribution is to formalize the notion of public key encryption with backward recovery (PKE-BR) as well as its associated security models. We then present a generic construction of PKE-BR using the "encrypt then sign" paradigm [2] . The basic idea underlying our construction is that an ephemeral key is encapsulated, called a key encapsulation mechanism or KEM, not only by a receiver's public key but also by a sender's, and the randomness re-use (RR) technique discussed in [4] is applied to reduce the bandwidth and computational cost. As for security analysis, we prove that our PKE-BR KEM is IND-CCA2 secure and existentially unforgeable in a two-user setting if the underlying two-receiver KEM is IND-CPA and the underlying signature is weakly unforgeable.
A downside of the generic construction is that it is not quite efficient due to the use of a signing procedure. It turns out that the "encrypt then sign" paradigm is in fact an overkill in the context of meeting the requirements of PKE-BR. One reason is that the receiver may not be always required to check the origin of a ciphertext. This happens in a situation where checking the origin of a ciphertext can be accomplished using an out-of-band method. For instance, a data center may process and store data received from legitimate users only, who are required to login and prove their identities before being allowed to use any service of the data center. Yet another reason is that the originator may not be willing to have his or her identity being tied to a ciphertext explicitly which is necessarily the case when a typical digital signature scheme is employed.
The above observations motivate us to design a more efficient PKE-BR scheme, by converting Hofheinz and Kiltz's public key encryption scheme [11] into a tag based KEM. Hofheinz and Kiltz's scheme, which is based on factoring in the standard model, is very efficient and requires only about two exponentiations for encryption and roughly one exponentiation for decryption. As was already discussed by Hofheinz and Kiltz in [11] , an interesting property of the scheme is that the RSA modulus N can be shared among many users. This property allows the application of our backward recovery technique in the resulting scheme. Furthermore, we observe that a target collision resistant hash function suffices to guarantee the integrity of a ciphertext and a message authentication code can be applied to allow the sender to verify the origin of a ciphertext. Proving the security of this efficient scheme, however, turns out to be more challenging. The main difficulty of the security proof lies in the fact that the setting of the simulated receiver's public key is related to the adversary's challenge tag and relying on the factoring assumption only turns out to be inadequate. Hence the security proof of our scheme cannot follow that of [11] directly. To overcome this problem, we resort to the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption in addition to the factoring assumption, so that a simulated receiver's public key can be proven to be indistinguishable from a public key in a real scheme by any probabilistic polynomial time adversary.
Related work. While backward recovery was already mentioned as "past message recovery" in early work on signcryption [3] and such an interesting property is still retained in some signcryption schemes, such as those in [3] [14] , not all signcryption schemes have such a property, and more importantly, the concept and formal definition of backward recovery are yet to be further studied.
A somewhat related notion is multi-receiver signcryption [8] [17] [16] which can provide not only confidentiality and integrity but also authenticity and non-repudiation for multiple receivers. In fact, a sender in our generic construction plays the role of a receiver in a multi-receiver signcryption setting. Notice that the roles of the two "receivers" (the sender and the receiver) in our setting are not equal, which results in a critical difference between our second scheme and traditional multi-receiver signcryptions. That is, the receiver has to check the integrity of a ciphertext in its entirety, including both the sender's part and the receiver's part, while the sender does not have to check the receiver's part. Although the receiver in our second scheme cannot verify the origin of a ciphertext, the scheme is very much suitable for an application environment where the sender's identity can be verified easily by some out-of-band methods, say, login authentication of a data center or subscriber authentication of a cell phone network.
Preliminaries
Notations. Z N denotes the set of integers modulo N and |u| denotes the absolute value of u, where u ∈ Z N is interpreted as a signed integer with
[N ] denotes the set of integers 1, 2, ..., N . PPT denotes probabilistic polynomial time. A real-valued function µ over integers is said to be negligible if it approaches 0 at a rate faster than the inverse of a polynomial over integers.
Target-collision resistant hash functions. A hash function H : {0, 1} l → {0, 1} l H is (ε Hash , t)-target collision resistant if no probabilistic t-polynomial time algorithm A can output a y such that H(y) = H(x) and y = x for a given x ∈ {0, 1} l with a probability at least ε Hash , when a security parameter (which is typically played by l H ) is sufficiently large. H is simply said to be target collision resistant if ε Hash can be any inverse polynomial and t be any polynomial in the security parameter.
Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption in groups with composite order. Let G be an Abelian group with composite order N = (P − 1)(Q − 1), where P and Q are large primes such that |P | = |Q|. Here, |P | (or |Q|) denotes the binary length of P (or Q). g ∈ G is a generator of G. The decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption states that, for any PPT algorithm A, there exists a negligible function µ such that for all sufficiently large |Q|
where the probability is taken over the random choices of g, a, b, c and the coin-tosses of A.
In this paper, we consider the DDH assumption in the quadratic residue group QR N , where N = (2p + 1)(2q + 1) is a Blum integer such that p, q, (2p + 1) and (2q + 1) are all primes.
Blum-Blum-Shub (BBS) pseudorandom number generator [6] . Let
denote the BBS pseudorandom number generator, where LSB N (u) denotes the least significant bit of u mod N . BBS is pseudorandom if factoring Blum integer N is hard. (For details, please refer to Theorem 2 of [11] .) The pseudorandomness of BBS is defined by a pseudorandomness test described as follows.
PRNG experiment for BBS generator [11] . For an algorithm D, define the advantage of D as Adv
where N is a Blum integer, u ∈ QR N is uniformly chosen, z = u 2 l k , and We say the adversary wins the game if (m * , σ * ) ∈ Sig and σ * can be verified to be a valid signature for m * . A signature scheme is weakly unforgeable if the probability that the adversary wins the game is negligible. The above game captures the existential unforgeability with respect to weak chosen-message attacks (or generic chosen message attacks [9] ) against digital signature, where the generation of the message list M does not depend on the public key pk Sig . We follow the definition of weak unforgeability in [12] except that in [12] , the adversary is said to win the game if m * ∈ {m 1 , ..., m n } and σ * can be verified to be a valid signature for m * .
3 Security requirements and models
Security requirements
To illustrate the security requirements of PKE-BR, we take the mail transfer as an example and consider a communication model of three communicating parties, including the message storage and transfer agent (MSTA), Alice (a sender) and Bob (a receiver). Note that this communication model also includes the case of a data center, where the data center plays both the role of the MSTA and that of the receiver. The main procedure of a PKE-BR scheme can be divided into the following phases. From the above procedure, one can see that when a weak public key encryption scheme is applied, m may be potentially leaked and/or modified during any of the following three phases: (1) transmission from Alice to Bob, (2) residing in the storage device of a MSTA, and (3) transmission from the MSTA back to Alice. This justifies the following three security requirements for PKE-BR:
• Confidentiality of the plaintext m. For the confidentiality, we adopt the notion of indistinguishability under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2) [15] .
• Integrity of the ciphertext c. Bob the receiver can be assured that the ciphertext c is not modified during transmission from Alice to Bob.
• PKE-BR authenticity. Alice the sender can be assured that a ciphertext c received and a plaintext m recovered from c are both initially produced by/originated from herself.
The first requirement is a standard security requirement for any encryption scheme. The second one can be achieved by checking the integrity of the ciphertext. (Note that the first requirement does not necessarily imply the second.) To fulfill the third security requirement, a primitive which enables Alice to verify the authenticity of a ciphertext, such as a public key signature or a message authentication code, may be employed.
Key encapsulation with backward recovery
It is known that a key encapsulation mechanism or KEM can be converted to a hybrid encryption [1] . Similar techniques can be applied to construct a PKE-BR scheme from a KEM-BR (KEM with backward recovery). Hence, our focus will be on KEM-BR. In this section, we describe a public key KEM-BR, which consists of a tuple of five algorithms.
Common Parameter Generation
• A probabilistic common parameter generation algorithm, Com. It takes as input a security parameter 1 k and returns the common parameter I.
Key Generation
• A probabilistic sender key generation algorithm Key S . It takes as input the common parameter I and outputs a private/public key pair (sk S , pk S ) for the sender.
• A probabilistic receiver key generation algorithm Key R . It takes as input the common parameter I and outputs a private/public key pair (sk R , pk R ) for the receiver.
Symmetric Key Generation and Encapsulation
• A probabilistic symmetric key generation and encapsulation algorithm, KGE. It takes the common parameter I, the sender's private/public key pair (sk S , pk S ) and the receiver's public key pk R as input and outputs the symmetric key K, the state information s and the encapsulated value C KGE . KGE consists of the following two algorithms.
(a) A probabilistic symmetric key generation algorithm, Sym. It takes I as input, and outputs a symmetric key K and some state information denoted by s. (b) A probabilistic key encapsulation algorithm, Encap. It takes the state information s, the sender's private/public key (sk S , pk S ) and the receiver's public key pk R as input, and returns an encapsulated value C KGE . More precisely, Encap consists of two algorithms, a key encapsulation algorithm KE and a key authentication algorithm KA which function as follows: -KE takes the state information s and the receiver's public key pk R as input and returns E 1 . -KE takes the state information s and the sender's public key pk S as input and returns E 2 . Denote (E 1 , E 2 ) by E. -KA takes (E, sk S , pk S ) as input and returns σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ), where σ 1 provides integrity and σ 2 provides authenticity, respectively. Encap outputs C KGE = (E, σ) = (C R , C S ), where C R = (E 1 , σ 1 ) is intended for the receiver and C S = (E 2 , σ 2 ) for the sender.
Decapsulation
• A deterministic decapsulation algorithm, Decap. It takes the sender's public key pk S , the receiver's private/public key pair (sk R , pk R ) and C KGE as input, and returns either a symmetric key K or a unique error symbol ⊥. Decap consists of two algorithms, an integrity check algorithm IC and a key decapsulation algorithm KD whose functions are described below:
-IC takes the sender's public key pk S , the receiver's private/public key pair (sk R , pk R ) and C KGE as input, and outputs either "OK" or ⊥. -If IC does not return ⊥, KD takes as input the receiver's private/public key pair (sk R , pk R ) and C KGE , and outputs a symmetric key K.
Backward Recovery
• A deterministic backward recovery algorithm Recov. It takes sk S , pk S , pk R and C KGE as input and returns ⊥ or a symmetric key K. Recov consists of two algorithms KAC and KD. The former is for checking key authenticity and the latter for key decapsulation.
-KAC takes the sender's private/public key pair (sk S ,pk S ), the receiver's public key pk R and C KGE as input, and outputs either "OK" or ⊥.
-If KAC does not return ⊥, KD takes as input the sender's private/public key pair (sk S , pk S ), the receiver's public key pk R and C KGE , and outputs a symmetric key K.
Remark. Note that the description of KEM-BR is based on the model for signcryptions [5] [7] . Compared with signcryptions [5] [7] , in our model authenticity and integrity checks, however, are separated. That is, the receiver only has to execute integrity check, while the sender has to execute authenticity check. A further difference is that the generation of a symmetric key (ephemeral key) K does not involve the receiver's (or sender's) private key in our model. Hence, the adversary does not have to query the symmetric key generation "oracle" in the following security models.
Security models

IND-CCA2 security for KEM-BR in the two-user setting
The IND-CCA2 game for KEM-BR is played by two parties, an adversary and a challenger.
1. The challenger generates a common parameter I ← Com(1 k ), a sender's private/public key pair (sk S , pk S ) ← Key S (I) and a receiver's key pair (sk R , pk R ) ← Key R (I).
2. Given (I, pk S , pk R ), the adversary A can make the following three kinds of queries to the corresponding oracles.
• 
BR unforgeability in the two-user setting
For the authenticity and the integrity of KEM-BR, we require that it should be infeasible for an adversary to forge a valid C KGE . Note that the receiver's key pair is fixed before the adversary issues any query in the two-user setting. The attack game of unforgeability goes as follows.
The challenger first generates I
It then passes (I,pk S ,sk R ,pk R ) over to the adversary.
The adversary
We say that the adversary wins the above game if the following conditions hold.
• C KGE is not returned by O Encap with pk R as q Encap .
•
Security model in the multi-user setting. The corresponding security model in the multi-user setting for KEM-BR is similar to that in the two-user setting, except that the adversary can issue any public key pk as q Encap and pk may be generated by the adversary at his will.
A generic construction
In this section, we show how to construct a secure KEM-BR in the two-user setting from an IND-CPA KEM and a weakly unforgeable signature. The generic construction, which is based on the "encrypt then sign" techniques [2] , goes as follows. 1. Using a randomness reusing (RR) technique, an IND-CPA KEM can be converted to an IND-CPA two-receiver KEM 1 . The two "receivers" are the receiver R and the sender S. (Notice that, not all the IND-CPA KEM can be converted to an IND-CPA two-receiver KEM using RR [4] .) Let KEM 2 = (Com 2 , Key 2 , KGE 2 , KD 2 ) denote the resulting two-receiver KEM and C = (C R , C S ) denote the output of KGE 2 (pk S ,pk R ).
2. Apply a weakly unforgeable signature Sig to C and output (C, Sig(sk Sig , C)), where sk Sig denotes the sender's signing key. We note that Sig plays the role of KA in the KEM-BR model.
3. For decapsulation and backward recovery, Sig(sk Sig , C) should be verified first using the sender's public key for the signature. If the signature is valid, decapsulating C is carried out as in the two-receiver KEM. That is, the receiver runs KD 2 (sk R , C) for decapsulation and the sender runs KD 2 (sk S , C) for backward recovery. As for the security of the resulting KEM-BR, we have the following Theorems 1 and 2.
Theorem 1 KEM-BR is IND-CCA2 secure in the two-user setting if the underlying two-receiver KEM is IND-CPA and the signature is weakly unforgeable.
Proof. If there exists a PPT algorithm A that breaks the IND-CCA2 security of KEM-BR in the two-user setting, we show that one can use A to construct a PPT algorithm B to break the IND-CPA security of the underlying two-receiver KEM or the weak unforgeability of the signature.
Given the sender's public key pk S and the receiver's public key pk R , B generates a set of ciphertexts List = {C 1 , C 2 , ..., C n } using KGE 2 (pk S , pk R ) and stores the corresponding key list K = {K 1 , ..., K n }, where n is the maximum number of encapsulation queries issued by A. When receiving the challenge (K * b , C * ) of the IND-CPA game, B sends List together with the challenge ciphertext C * to the challenger of the underlying signature Challenger Sig . Challenger Sig runs the key generation algorithm of the underlying signature scheme to get the public/secret key pair (pk Sig , sk Sig ), and returns the corresponding signature list List Sig ={σ 1 , ..., σ n } and σ * for the messages in List and C * . Upon receiving List Sig and σ * , B sets the ciphertext list C = { (C 1 , σ 1 ) ,...,(C n , σ n )} and the queried list Q = {∅}, and defines the challenge of the IND-CCA game as (K * b ; (C * , σ * )). Then B defines the sender's public key of KEM-BR as (pk S , pk Sig ) and the receiver's public key as pk R , and simulates the environment of an IND-CCA2 game of KEM-BR for A as follows.
In the first phase of the game, A can make the following three kinds of queries.
• The encapsulation query q Encap . When A forwards q Encap , B randomly chooses a ciphertext (C i , σ i ) ∈ C/Q, adds (C i , σ i ) to Q, and sends (C i , σ i ) to A.
1 See Appendix A for two-receiver KEM
• The decapsulation query q Decap . On receiving q Decap = (C, σ) , B checks the validity of σ.
There are two cases that we have to take into account.
-If σ is not valid, B returns ⊥.
-If σ is valid, B checks whether (C, σ) ∈ C. If (C, σ) ∈ C, B returns the corresponding key in K. If (C, σ) ∈ C and (C, σ) = (C * , σ * ), B outputs (C, σ) as a valid forgery for the underlying signature and terminates. Otherwise, (C, σ) = (C * , σ * ) and B terminates by outputting "failure".
• The recovery query q Recov . B acts in the same way as what he does in the decapsulation query.
B sends the challenge (K * b ; (C * , σ * )) to A. In the second phase, A can forward the same kinds of queries as previously, except (C, σ) = (C * , σ * ) in the key decapsulation query and in the recovery query. Finally, A outputs a bit b , which is also the output of B.
If B does not terminates during the decapsulation query or the recovery query, B perfectly simulates the KEM-BR scheme in the two-user setting for A. According to the assumption that A outputs the right b with a non-negligible advantage, B outputs the right b in the above IND-CPA game for the underlying two-receiver KEM with a non-negligible advantage. If B terminates and outputs (C, σ), σ is a valid forgery for the underlying signature. Note that the probability that C * appears in the queries of the first phase is negligible, since C * is independent of List and List Sig .
Theorem 2 KEM-BR is existentially unforgeable in the two-user setting if the underlying signature scheme is weakly unforgeable.
Proof. If there exists a PPT adversary A that can break the unforgeability of KEM-BR, we can use A as an oracle to construct a PPT adversary B that breaks the weak unforgeability of the underlying signature.
1. B generates the valid common parameter I and the public/secret encryption keys (pk S , sk S , pk R , sk R ) for both the sender and the receiver of the underlying KEM. Using the underlying KEM, B computes a list of ciphertexts List ={C 1 , ..., C n }, where n denotes the maximum number of the encapsulation queries made by A. Send List to the challenger as the messages that will be signed.
2. The challenger runs the key generation algorithm of the underlying signature scheme to get private/public key pair (sk Sig , pk Sig ), and returns the corresponding signatures list List Sig = {σ 1 , ..., σ n } for the messages in List.
Upon receiving List
Sig and pk Sig , B defines the sender's public key of KEM-BR as (pk S , pk Sig ) and the receiver's public key as pk R , computes the ciphertext list C = { (C 1 , σ 1 ) ,..., (C n , σ n )} and sets the queried list Q = {∅}. Then B can answer the encapsulation queries from A as in the proof of Theorem 1. Finally, A outputs a valid forgery (C * , σ * ) with a non-negligible probability. As a result, B can output σ * as the forgery for the underlying signature. Note that the success probability of B is the same as that of A.
This completes the proof for Theorem 2.
PKE-BR in the multi-user setting. An intuitive method of constructing PKE-BR scheme in the multi-user setting from KEM-BR is as follows.
1. Convert the KEM-BR scheme to a Tag-KEM using methods of [1] . More precisely, the signature of KEM-BR is computed as Sig(sk Sig , C, τ ), where τ is a tag. To prove the CCA2 security of the resulting Tag-KEM, the signature Sig is required to be existentially unforgeable against chosen message attack instead of weakly unforgeable.
2. Replace the tag with an IND-CCA2 secure DEM secure against passive attacks. The resulting scheme is a CCA2 Tag-KEM/DEM in the two-user setting.
3. Apply a generic transformation outlined in [2] to convert the scheme for the two-user setting to one for the multi-user setting. That is, the sender's public key is included in DEM as part of a plaintext and the receiver's public key is included in the signature, e.g., Sig(sk Sig , C, τ, pk R ) where τ = DEM (K, m, pk S ). Notice that the underlying encryption DEM should be IND-CCA2 secure in order to prevent the adversary from modifying DEM (K, m, pk S ) for a new related ciphertext [2] , say, DEM (K, m, pk ).
We emphasize that since the above transformation is an intuitive one, rigorous security proofs of the resulting scheme need to be further investigated when concrete KEM/DEM and signature schemes are used to instantiate the construction.
An efficient construction -Tag based KEM-BR
To construct a more efficient KEM-BR, we slightly relax the previous security requirements for KEM-BR: the sender only has to check the integrity and authenticity of the sender's part of a ciphertext. In other words, during the backward recovery phase, the sender runs KAC on input (sk S , pk S , pk R , C Recov ), where C Recov = C S denotes the sender's part of C KGE . With the modified security requirement, we can provide a concrete tag based KEM-BR (TBR) which is provably secure in the multi-user setting. The corresponding security model of TBR in the multi-user setting is similar to that of KEM-BR, except that the adversary is able to forward any public key as q Encap , and the tag τ is included in the computation of KGE. In addition, the adversary can choose any tag during the challenge phase. More details of the security model follow.
Security model of TBR in the multi-user setting
IND-CCA2. The IND-CCA2 game for TBR is played by two parties, the adversary and the challenger.
2. The adversary A is given (I, pk S , pk R ) and can make the following three kinds of queries.
• The encapsulation query q Encap . A forwards (pk, τ ) as the encapsulation query q Encap to the oracle O Encap , where the public key pk can be generated by the adversary and τ is the tag. Upon receiving q Encap , the oracle O Encap runs KGE(I, sk S , pk S , pk, τ ) and returns C KGE .
• The decapsulation query q Decap . A forwards (pk, C KGE , τ ) as the decapsulation query
• We say the adversary wins the above game if b = b.
Unforgeability. For the TBR scheme, we only require that it should be infeasible for an adversary to forge a valid C Recov . The adversary can choose the receiver to which the adversary wishes to forge. The attack game of unforgeability runs as follows. 
Tag based KEM-BR scheme (TBR)
Our TBR is based on the Hofheinz-Kiltz KEM [11] and a message authentication code (MAC). In our construction, the validity of MAC can be checked by the sender only. Furthermore, we take advantage of a target collision resistant hash function to guarantee that the receiver can check the integrity of the whole ciphertext. The TBR scheme is described below. Common Parameter Generation. A security parameter 1 k , a target collision resistant hash function H with l H -bit output, and a BBS pseudorandom number generator BBS N with l K -bit output. A M AC that is existentially unforgeable against chosen message attack. N = (2p + 1)(2q + 1) is a Blum integer such that p and q are two primes and |p| = |q| = k. g is the generator of QR N . Note that the factorization of N is kept secret.
Key Generation. The sender's private/public key pair is (sk S , pk S ) where sk S =(x S , sk M AC ), 
Symmetric Key Generation and Encapsulation by sender. KGE(I, sk S , pk S , pk R , τ )
Choose at random r ∈ [(N −1)/4] and compute
. If the equation holds, it outputs "OK"; otherwise, it outputs ⊥ and terminates.
Compute a, b, c ∈
If the equation holds, Recov returns "OK"; otherwise, it returns ⊥ and terminates.
Compute a, b and c such that 2
which is the output.
Correctness. Since the correctness of the computation of K in Decap and Recov can be verified in a similar way as in [11] , we only show that both (
, and holds in QR N , it is infeasible for any PPT adversary A to distinguish between tuple T 0 and tuple
IND-CCA2 security of TBR
where r is a random element in [(N − 1)/4], τ 1 is chosen uniformly at random, and τ 0 is generated by the adversary.
Proof. In Claim 1, we implicitly define the following game between the challenger and the adversary A . Given (N, g 1 , g 2 , g r  1 ) , the adversary A computes τ 0 and sends τ 0 to the challenger. Then the challenger returns T b , where b Due to Claim 3, we have that the challenge ciphertexts of Game 1 and Game 2 can be distinguished with advantage at most 2 −k+2 + 2ε DDH . Hence, we have 
Unforgeability
Theorem 4 TBR is existentially unforgeable if the underlying M AC is existentially unforgeable against chosen message attack.
The theorem can be proved by contradiction, namely if there exists an efficient algorithm A that breaks the unforgeability of TBR, we can then construct an efficient algorithm B to break the security of the underlying M AC. Descriptions of the proof are straightforward and hence are omitted.
Implementation
For implementation, H and HM AC can be instantiated with SHA-256 and HMAC-SHA-256, respectively, and AES can be applied for data encryption, where the symmetric key K is of length 128. The computational cost of the decapsulation (or the backward recovery) of TBR is similar to that of the decapsulation of the original Hofheinz-Kiltz encryption scheme [11] . For encapsulation, our scheme requires about one more full exponentiation than that of [11] , due to the computation of V 2 . However, more than 60% computation of the encapsulation can be processed offline. That is, P 1 = g r , P 2 = y r S and U = P 2 l H +l K 1 can be precomputed. On input the receiver's public key y R and the plaintext, compute V 2 = |P 
